Roumieh: Lebanon’s Nightmare
Has there ever been a country that revels in paradox as much as Lebanon? The constant dichotomies that have defined Lebanon since independence are represented in even the smallest microcosms of Lebanese society – Roumieh Prison being a chief example. On April 17th, Islamist prisoners housed in Roumieh’s Cellblock D rioted, briefly seizing between 14 and 20 guards before the uprising could be squelched.
In the wake of these riots, two startlingly different narratives emerged within the Lebanese media as well as among relatives of the Islamist prisoners, who took to the streets of Tripoli days later calling for the resignation of Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a member of the Future bloc. While prisoners and their family members have complained about regular abuse within Roumieh’s walls, sources within the prison have told quite a different story to media outlets[1]. This story presents Roumieh as a building de facto controlled by a minority of hardline Islamist prisoners, who have managed to transform their area of the prison into a sort of command center for extremists located in areas such as Akkar and the Bekaa.
Until recently this “Islamist HQ” was located in Cellblock B, a wing notorious for hosting some of the Middle East’s most dangerous fundamentalists. The restiveness of Cellblock B’s prisoners has long served as a barometer for Lebanon’s political situation – in recent years, members of Fatah al-Islam (the hardline Sunni group which flourished in Nahr al-Bared before the camp’s assault by the Lebanese Army) have given Lebanese authorities almost as many problems within the prison as outside its walls. In 2012, three of the groups members escaped Roumieh altogether, joining another five who managed to escape in August of 2011[2]. It is chilling to think of the extremist contacts these men made within Roumieh before their flights from captivity; the plethora of hardline groups represented in Cellblock B provides a perfect petri dish for radical ideologies to grow and develop, and relations to form between militant groups scattered throughout the Middle East and beyond.
Yet escape is not a necessity for inmates who wish to take part in extremist operations outside of the prison. Although inmates and relatives alike have complained about a lack of access to cell phones and computers, sources within the prison have painted a picture of the ubiquity of these devices, from which militants can maintain contacts outside the camp and even direct attacks. These privileges extend past possession of contraband; some reports have gone as far to allege that Cellblock B could at one point boast water purification facilities, inmate-owned coffee shops, and machinery used to manufacture swords, knives, and daggers[3]. Fatah al-Islam members used these weapons to forcibly control the larger prison population, forcing Shi’ite and Christian inmates to pay levies to keep them safe from harm and attempting to brutally silence opposition even among other Islamists.
In January, security forces stormed Cellblock B. They were reacting to twin suicide bombings against Alawites in Jabal Mohsen, Tripoli – bombings believed to have been coordinated by extremists within the prison. The assault on Cellblock B yielded plans that called for further terrorist attacks in Lebanon. It also displaced around 900 Islamists to Cellblock D, which swelled from a max capacity of 400 to an overwhelming 1,100 prisoners. Harsh new security measures were announced, with wall-mounted cellphone jammers installed and Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk claiming that heads of guards would be “cut off” if cellphones were discovered in inmates’ cells[4]. It is these security measures that have led relatives of Islamists to gather in Tripoli and demand the resignation of Machnouk, who they accuse of fostering a climate of prisoner abuse.
Machnouk’s hyperboles will not solve the problem of Roumieh, nor will showing brutality towards its inmates. Overcrowded, outdated, and with conditions so appalling that they fail to meet basic UN standards, Roumieh has a long way to go before it can serve the purpose it is designed. It is a necessity that the prison be expanded or that other correctional facilities be built to house the influx of prisoners from all walks of Lebanese society. Additional steps must be taken, such as sequestering Islamists not only from the general population but also from each other, preventing the sort of contact that has undoubtedly resulted in hardship for the people of Lebanon and its neighbors.
Yet given the functional impotence of Lebanon’s government, the possibility of any real reforms being enacted is slim to none. The Lebanese state is barely capable of imposing rule of law among its most law-abiding citizens; any hope of improvements among its criminal population is scant at best. Additionally, Western concepts of prisoner rehabilitation are not common among Lebanese; Roumieh is much more likely to further radicalize an inmate than begin to draw him away from fundamentalism. And so the cycle of riots and terrorism will continue, strangely spurred both by the prison’s excessive leniency as well as its deplorable living conditions. Roumieh seems condemned to a future of stasis, instability, and unrest – much the same as the country in which it is housed.
Claude Khalife
[1] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12967
[2] http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/64443
[3] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12967
[4] http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-13/283917-terror-plans-seized-in-roumieh-raid.ashx
Has there ever been a country that revels in paradox as much as Lebanon? The constant dichotomies that have defined Lebanon since independence are represented in even the smallest microcosms of Lebanese society – Roumieh Prison being a chief example. On April 17th, Islamist prisoners housed in Roumieh’s Cellblock D rioted, briefly seizing between 14 and 20 guards before the uprising could be squelched.
In the wake of these riots, two startlingly different narratives emerged within the Lebanese media as well as among relatives of the Islamist prisoners, who took to the streets of Tripoli days later calling for the resignation of Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a member of the Future bloc. While prisoners and their family members have complained about regular abuse within Roumieh’s walls, sources within the prison have told quite a different story to media outlets[1]. This story presents Roumieh as a building de facto controlled by a minority of hardline Islamist prisoners, who have managed to transform their area of the prison into a sort of command center for extremists located in areas such as Akkar and the Bekaa.
Until recently this “Islamist HQ” was located in Cellblock B, a wing notorious for hosting some of the Middle East’s most dangerous fundamentalists. The restiveness of Cellblock B’s prisoners has long served as a barometer for Lebanon’s political situation – in recent years, members of Fatah al-Islam (the hardline Sunni group which flourished in Nahr al-Bared before the camp’s assault by the Lebanese Army) have given Lebanese authorities almost as many problems within the prison as outside its walls. In 2012, three of the groups members escaped Roumieh altogether, joining another five who managed to escape in August of 2011[2]. It is chilling to think of the extremist contacts these men made within Roumieh before their flights from captivity; the plethora of hardline groups represented in Cellblock B provides a perfect petri dish for radical ideologies to grow and develop, and relations to form between militant groups scattered throughout the Middle East and beyond.
Yet escape is not a necessity for inmates who wish to take part in extremist operations outside of the prison. Although inmates and relatives alike have complained about a lack of access to cell phones and computers, sources within the prison have painted a picture of the ubiquity of these devices, from which militants can maintain contacts outside the camp and even direct attacks. These privileges extend past possession of contraband; some reports have gone as far to allege that Cellblock B could at one point boast water purification facilities, inmate-owned coffee shops, and machinery used to manufacture swords, knives, and daggers[3]. Fatah al-Islam members used these weapons to forcibly control the larger prison population, forcing Shi’ite and Christian inmates to pay levies to keep them safe from harm and attempting to brutally silence opposition even among other Islamists.
In January, security forces stormed Cellblock B. They were reacting to twin suicide bombings against Alawites in Jabal Mohsen, Tripoli – bombings believed to have been coordinated by extremists within the prison. The assault on Cellblock B yielded plans that called for further terrorist attacks in Lebanon. It also displaced around 900 Islamists to Cellblock D, which swelled from a max capacity of 400 to an overwhelming 1,100 prisoners. Harsh new security measures were announced, with wall-mounted cellphone jammers installed and Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk claiming that heads of guards would be “cut off” if cellphones were discovered in inmates’ cells[4]. It is these security measures that have led relatives of Islamists to gather in Tripoli and demand the resignation of Machnouk, who they accuse of fostering a climate of prisoner abuse.
Machnouk’s hyperboles will not solve the problem of Roumieh, nor will showing brutality towards its inmates. Overcrowded, outdated, and with conditions so appalling that they fail to meet basic UN standards, Roumieh has a long way to go before it can serve the purpose it is designed. It is a necessity that the prison be expanded or that other correctional facilities be built to house the influx of prisoners from all walks of Lebanese society. Additional steps must be taken, such as sequestering Islamists not only from the general population but also from each other, preventing the sort of contact that has undoubtedly resulted in hardship for the people of Lebanon and its neighbors.
Yet given the functional impotence of Lebanon’s government, the possibility of any real reforms being enacted is slim to none. The Lebanese state is barely capable of imposing rule of law among its most law-abiding citizens; any hope of improvements among its criminal population is scant at best. Additionally, Western concepts of prisoner rehabilitation are not common among Lebanese; Roumieh is much more likely to further radicalize an inmate than begin to draw him away from fundamentalism. And so the cycle of riots and terrorism will continue, strangely spurred both by the prison’s excessive leniency as well as its deplorable living conditions. Roumieh seems condemned to a future of stasis, instability, and unrest – much the same as the country in which it is housed.
Claude Khalife
[1] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12967
[2] http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/64443
[3] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12967
[4] http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-13/283917-terror-plans-seized-in-roumieh-raid.ashx